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 Mobile nodes roaming around in the hostile environment of mobile adhoc 
network (MANET) play the role of router as well as terminal. While acting 
as a router, a node needs to choose a reliable routing protocol. Besides, an 
encryption algorithm is needed to secure data to be conveyed through the 
unfriendly atmosphere while acting as a terminal. We have implemented 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) along with Adhoc On Demand Multipath 
Distance Vector (AOMDV) routing protocol to secure data transmission 
against blackhole attack in a MANET. ECC, a public key cryptography that 
works on discrete logarithm problem with a much smaller key size, has been 
used to encrypt data packets at source node before transmission. We have 
used AOMDV, a reliable routing protocol compared to its parent protocol, 
Adhoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV), with a multipath extension, 
for routing. The encrypted packets transferring between nodes via AOMDV, 
has been proved secured against blackhole attack. The performance of the 
secured protocol has been analyzed in terms of different performance metrics 
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A Mobile Ad-hoc network (MANET) consists of a number of nodes communicating in an 
infrastructureless manner using the radio frequency channel. Besides playing the role of a terminal, every 
node needs to act as router. The protocols used for data transmission in MANET assume a trusted 
environment and thus security issues are not in built. The environment can be considered adversary as data 
transmitted by a source node can be collected by a compromised node within its direct transmission range. 
Security might be achieved by avoiding the attacker nodes through intrusion detection techniques. The other 
way is to secure the data to be transmitted over a hostile environment so that the data is kept protected even 
after attack. Following the second technique, we have used Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) along with 
Adhoc on Demand Multipath Distance Vector (AOMDV) protocol and have shown the impact on blackhole 
attack.  
Mobile nodes travelling in mobile adhoc networks are vulnerable to attacks. Thus, security becomes 
a very sensitive issue in MANET. To ensure secure transmission, various encryption algorithms have already 
been used with various protocols. Still the fragile nature of the protocols does not let them keep data 
transmission secure for a long period of time. In this work, we have shown the impact of ECC based 
AOMDV on blackhole attack and analyzed its performance using various performance metrics in respect of 
time and against varying number of blackhole attacker nodes. In the previous work [1], we only dealt with 
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the performance against time. Sonal Shrivastava et al [2] proposed a scheme of Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) that uses a hop count mechanism to detect the attacker. The proposed IDS scheme keeps record of the 
routing information, the intermediate node that receives the data, the next hop of that node. It gathers the 
attacker information, forwards to the network and defends further participation. Vandana Arora et al [3] 
presented a trusted and authenticate environment that is created by RSA based signature and implemented 
with AODV protocol. They have used RSA encryption algorithm that uses a larger sized key and the routing 
protocol, AODV provides no multipath facility. Priyanka Bansal et al [4] study the effect of blackhole attack 
and neighbor attack on AOMDV protocol. Any solution to the attacks has not been proposed. M Janardhana 
Raju et al [5] proposed a system based on Elliptic curve ElGamal Encryption technique and used it with 
AODV. In our proposed system, we emphasized on the encryption algorithm that is more secure and the 
protocol, AOMDV with less overhead. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 discusses the properties of AOMDV 
protocol, blackhole attack, the detail of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the reasons behind choosing 
AOMDV as routing protocol and ECC as encryption technique, the later of this section is about the 
methodology and contribution, section 3 shows the simulation scenario and results and performance analysis 
of AOMDV before and after security implemented. In section 4, we conclude our work with future scope. 
 
 
2. RESEARCH METHOD 
2.1.   Properties of AOMDV 
The key of the AOMDV protocol lies in ensuring that multiple paths discovered are loop-free and 
disjoint. The route discovery is maintained by a flood-based mechanism. AOMDV route update rules are 
implemented to every node in order to maintain loop-freedom and disjointness. AOMDV uses the routing 
information already available in the basic AODV protocol [6], thereby reducing the overhead caused while 
discovering multiple paths [7]. The properties that are maintained by AOMDV protocol are as follows: 
a. Loop Freedom 
Loop freedom in AOMDV is maintained by the parameter ‘Advertised_hopcount’. The advertised 
hopcount represents the maximum hopcount of the multiple paths for the destination available at the source 
node. The advertised hopcount remains constant for the same sequence number. The protocol only accepts 
alternate routes with lower hopcounts, thus guarantees loop freedom. 
b. Disjoint Path 
One of the following two types of disjoint paths is maintained by AOMDV protocol: 
1. Node-disjoint path: The path that does not have any node in common. 
2. Link-disjoint path: Link-disjoint paths do not have any common links. Though, link-disjoint paths may 
have nodes in common. Link disjointness is maintained by AOMDV as node-disjointness is much stricter 
than link-disjointness and presents lesser number of disjoint routes. Thus, is less effective. 
c. Multiple Path Maintenance 
AOMDV processes every RREQ packet to maintain multiple paths. While its parent node, AODV 
processes the first RREQ sent from a source node to create a communicating path between two nodes and 
discard the other ones. 
d. Fresh route maintenance 
AOMDV chooses routing path by considering the maximum sequence number and thus maintains 
fresh route. In case of same sequence number, it considers minimum hop count. The types of sequence 
number maintained by AOMDV are: 
1. Source Sequence Number: Every node maintains a monotonically increasing sequence number. 
2. Destination Sequence Number: Every node maintains the highest known sequence number for each 
destination in the routing table. 
 
2.2. Blackhole Attack 
Blackhole Attack is a kind of attack where the attacker node sends a false RREP as an answer to the 
RREQ and shows itself as a routing node with the freshest route by generating a larger sequence number. In 
this attack [8] [9], the adversary node attracts packets but does not transmit any packet to the destination, 
rather drops them all. Due to this attack the packets sends by the nodes do not reach their proposed 
destination. AOMDV generally chooses an alternate path when a path is blocked by an attacker node.  
The problem mainly occurs when every other path is blocked by a number of attacker nodes and the attacker 
node acting as a router camouflages itself as a valid one. The Figure 1 shows a MANET where the packet 
transmitted by the source, S destined for D is achieved by M, a blackhole attacker node playing the role of a 
router with greater sequence number. A, B and C are the intermediate nodes. 
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Figure 1. Blackhole attackRREQ: Route request, RREP: Route reply, seq_no: sequence number 
 
 
2.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used to describe a group of cryptographic tools and protocols 
where the security is based on the discrete logarithm problem. ECC is based on sets of numbers and 
equations that are associated with elliptic curves [10]. ECC works in the following phases: 
a. Key Generation 
1. Global Public Elements 
a) Ep(a,b) elliptic curve with parameters a, b & p in the equation:Y2 mod p=(X3+aX+b) mod p                 
b) G is the base point on elliptic curve 
2. User A Key Generation 
a) Select private key nA               ; nA<n 
b) Calculate public key, P=nA×G          
3. User B Key Generation 
a) Select private key, nB             ; nB<n 
b) Calculate public key, M=nB×G     
4. Generation of Secret Key by user A, P1=k=nA×M                            
5. Generation of Secret Key by user B,P2=k=nB×P                             
The two calculations produce the same result because nA×M=nA×(nB×G)=nB×(nA×G)=nB×P.              
b. ECC Encryption 
1. Consider a message ‘Pm’ sent from A to B. 
2. User ‘A’ chooses a random positive integer ‘k’, a private key ‘nA’ and generates the public key,  
3. PA=nA×G.                                      
4. Chooses G, the base point selected on the Elliptic Curve Ep (a, b). 
5. Produces the ciphertext, consisting of pair of points, Cm={kG, Pm+kPB}=(C1, C2) where,  
6. PB=nB×G.                           
7. The public key of B with private key ‘nB’. 
c. ECC Decryption 
1. To decrypt the ciphertext, Cm, B multiplies the first point in the pair, C1 by B’s secret key. 
2. Subtracts the result from the second point, C2, Pm + kPB - nB (kG)=Pm + k (nB G) – nB (kG)=Pm.  
 
2.4. Why AOMDV? 
AOMDV, Adhoc on Demand Multipath Distance Vector Protocol [7], is the multipath extension of 
the renowned AODV protocol. Being the multipath extended version, it provides more alternate paths and 
thus is more reliable. It reduces the overhead caused by link failure and route discovery. In AOMDV, route 
discovery is only needed when every alternate link is broken. 
 
2.5. Why ECC? 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a reliable and efficient public key cryptographic technique that 
provides equivalent security as other public key cryptographic techniques but with smaller key  
size [10], [11]. Moreover, It is based on the discrete logarithm problem [12] which states that if K=nxG, then 
it is easy to derive K with given n and G, but tough to reveal n with given K and G. Thus with ECC, it will be 
tough for the blackhole attacker node to retrieve the private key from given secret key and public key. 
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2.6. Methodology 
The AOMDV protocol first discovers the multipath route to the destination through route discovery 
process and sends the packets to it. The flowchart of the discovery is shown in Figure 2. At the very 
beginning of data transmission, the source node broadcasts RREQ and the next hop that has route to the 
destination sends back RREP. On the contrary to AODV, AOMDV processes every RREQ. While AODV 
processes only the first RREQ and discards the rest. By processing every RREQ, AOMDV ensures multipath 
connectivity. The destination node chooses one of the multipaths by comparing the sequence number.  
The freshest route is guaranteed by considering the largest sequence number. In case of equal sequence 
number, path with less hop count is considered to ensure the shortest path. The destination forwards the 
RREP to the source node and the path is defined for data transmission. 
After transmitting number of packets, AOMDV avoids the malicious node as it is designed so and 
restrains the source node from transmitting packets to the attacker node. In the meanwhile, some of the 
packets have already been retrieved by the attacker node. Our goal is to secure those retrieved packets from 
revealing. Thus to secure the data packets, the packets are encrypted by ECC. This is done by creating a 
secure agent that generates the encrypted packet. The packet is then reached the destination through one of 





Figure 2. Flow chart of route discovery with AOMDV protocol. RREQ: Route request, RREP: Route reply, 
seq_no: sequence number 
 
 
Every time a node works as a source, it generates a private/public key pair. Firstly, it chooses a 
random private key, generates a secret key from its own private key and receiver’s public key. Then it 
encrypts the packet with the newly generated secret key and announces the public key. The encrypted packet 
is sent via AOMDV protocol. After receiving the encrypted packet, the destination node generates the same 
secret key with the help of its own private key and the sender’s new public key. Then using its shared secret 
key and private/public key pair, the receiver decrypts the packet to get the original data as shown in Figure 3. 
It will be tough for the malicious node to retrieve the private key from given secret key and the public key. 
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Thus, if an attacker manages to reveal the secret key, it would be a challenge to retrieve the private key 





Figure 3. Packet encryption by ECC 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We have used NS-2.35 for the simulation of the proposed system, a discrete-event simulation 
instrument that has been proved functional in studying the vibrant nature of MANET. The performance is 
measured in three cases: without malicious node, with three blackhole attacker nodes and with ECC 
implementation. 
The metrics that are used for analyzing the performance [5] of the protocol are described below: 
a. Average Throughput 




lysuccessfusent  packets ofNumber 
 
 
b. Packet Delivery Ratio 
It is the ratio of total number of packets successfully received at the destination nodes to the number 
of packets forwarded by the source nodes throughout the simulation. 
 
Packet Delivery Ratio=
PacketsSent  ofNumber 
Packets Received ofNumber 
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c. Average End-to-End Delay 






i 0 eivedPacketsRec ofNumber  Total
Sent)Packet  of Time- Recivedpacket  of (Time
 
 
d. Normalized Routing Load 
The number of routing packets transmitted per data packet delivered at the destination. 
 
3.1. Simulation Scenario 
In NS-2.35, we have considered an area of 1186 x 584 meters and the wireless topology we have 
used contains 25 nodes including 3 blackhole attacker nodes. The maximum speed of the mobile nodes is 
0.1Mbps. The total time used for simulation is 100 seconds. The simulation scenario is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Simulation Environment 
Simulation Parameter Value 
Simulator NS-2.35 
Area 1186 x 584 
Routing protocol AOMDV 
Attack Blackhole attack 
Packet size 1000,1500 
Number of nodes 25 
Number of attacker nodes 3 
Traffic type CBR,UDP 
Node Placement Random 
Simulation time 100 sec 
 
 
The output NAM file is shown in Figure 4 which is generated as a result of simulation. NAM stands 






Figure 4. Output NAM file 
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In Figure 4, the blue node represents the destination, the sources are denoted by green and the red 
ones are the blackhole attacker nodes. Four source nodes are transmitting packets in time intervals of 20 
seconds. From the generated trace files, different performance metrics are measured such as average 
throughput, end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio and normalized routing load as shown in Table 2. 
 
 






AOMDV with ECC 
(against Blackhole Attack) 
Total CBR packets sent 1241 1241 1492 
CBR packets received 1240 48 238 
Packet delivery ratio 0.9992 0.0387 0.1595 
End-to-end delay (ms) 85690.5 85656.3 85661 
Normalized Routing Load 0.110 2.792 0.542 
Average Throughput (kbps) 354.969 220.408 293.089 
 
 
The data from Table 2 has been used to plot the performance metrics. The performance metrics are 
measured in every 10 seconds and is analyzed against time and number of malicious nodes consecutively. 
 
 
3.2. Performance Analysis against Time 
The curve in Figure 5 shows that the throughput without any malicious activity rises to about 355 
kbps, the throughput dropped to about 220 kbps on the presence of malicious nodes. But with ECC 





Figure 5. Time vs. throughput curve. nomal_th: Throughput with no malicious node, mal_th: Throughput 
with malicious node, sec_th: Throughput with security 
 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the packet delivery ratio kept reducing on the presence of blackhole attacker 
nodes in the MANET and drops to about 0.04 with three attackers. But when the proposed method is 
implemented then even with the attacker nodes being present in the network, the packet delivery ratio 
improved considerably to above 0.15. 
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Figure 6. Time vs. packet delivery ratio curve. nomal_pkt: PDR with no malicious node, mal_pkt: PDR with 
malicious node, sec_pkt: PDR with security 
 
 
The end-to-end delay is almost same in all the three cases as seen in Figure 7. Initially the delay is a 






Figure 7. Time vs. delay curve. nomal_delay: End-to-end delay with no malicious node, mal_delay: End-to-
end delay with malicious node, sec_delay: End-to-end delay with security 
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The graph in Figure 8 illustrated the normalized routing load for the three mentioned cases. The 
Normalized Routing Load is about 0.1 without attack; it raises high above 2.0 in the presence of attack and 





Figure 8. Time vs. normalized routing load curve. nomal_nor_rt_ld: Normalized routing load with no 
malicious node, mal_nor_rt_ld: Normalized routing load with malicious node, sec_nor_rt_ld: Normalized 
routing load with security 
 
 
3.3. Performance Analysis against Number of Malicious Nodes 
As in Figure 9, we observe that with varying number of malicious nodes, the average throughput 





Figure 9. Number of malicious nodes vs. Average Throughput with secured AOMDV 
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The Packet Delivery ratio is definitely highest with no malicious node in the environment. It 
decreases slowly with increasing number of malicious nodes as in Figure 10. The average end-to-end delay 
shown in Figure 11 increases gradually with incremented malicious nodes as time is taken by the encryption 










Figure 11. Number of malicious nodes vs. Average Delay with secured AOMDV 
 
 
As shown in Figure 12, the normalized routing load grows with the number of blackhole attacker 










A MANET is subject to a variety of attacks. This paper proposes a way to secure data transmission 
in MANET so that data may remain confident when a negotiated node gets its proprietary. We have chosen 
blackhole attack, a very common one, to analyze the impact of secured AOMDV, though security is needed 
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to be imposed on every other attack. An intrusion detection system (IDS) along with proposed system may 
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